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I. Introduction
As the world grew increasingly infatuated with cloud computing, users abandoned traditional
storage methods and “entrusted” their data to network servers of communications service providers
(“CSPs”).1 Along with convenience and cost-saving advantages, cloud storage presented issues in the area
of cross-border data access that demanded attention from lawmakers. In particular, as cross-border data
requests increased exponentially, foreign governments expressed frustrations over the lengthy process to
obtain electronic information held by U.S.-based CSPs as well as the stringent U.S. legal standards they
must overcome.2 Moreover, a CSP often encounters conflicting situations where compliance with one
country’s data request may infringe on another country’s privacy guarantees.3 In other words, the law of
the requesting country may command disclosure while the receiving country’s law forbids it, or vice versa.4
The nature of cloud computing itself has also generated headaches for law enforcement. Some of
the largest CSPs, many of which headquartered in the United States,5 have a global presence and operate
networks of data storage centers in many different countries. Frequently, data is not permanently stored in
one location but travels across borders randomly and automatically.6 This has generated jurisdictional
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1
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Promoting Public Safety, Privacy, and the Rule of Law Around the World,
White Paper, 2–3 (Apr. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153446/download [hereinafter White
Paper]; Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swine, The CLOUD Act: A Welcoming Legislative Fix for Cross-Border Data
Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloud-act-welcome-legislative-fix-crossborder-data-problems.
2
See Derek B. Johnson, CLOUD Act Set to Pass in Omnibus, FCW (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/03/22/cloud-act-omnibus-johnson.aspx.
3
White Paper, supra note 1.
4
See 18 U.S.C. §101(4) (2018).
5
The top three cloud providers, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform, as of 2019, are
all U.S.-based companies. Larry Dignan, Top Cloud Providers 2019: AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud; IBM
Makes Hybrid Move; Salesforce Dominates SaaS, ZDNET (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/top-cloudproviders-2019-aws-microsoft-azure-google-cloud-ibm-makes-hybrid-move-salesforce-dominates-saas/.
6
See Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Hitchhiker’s Guide to Cross Border Data Flows, OECD (June 19, 2019),
https://www.oecd.org/trade/hitchhikers-guide-cross-border-data-flows (“With the adoption of cloud computing, data
lives in many places at once with different bits of data or copies of data stored in different countries simultaneously.”).

1

problems for law enforcement in their effort to track down such data, particularly when the nature of the
crime is serious, and the circumstances are urgent.7 Adding to the aggravation, some U.S.-based CSPs
resisted access altogether, arguing that the requested data was technically under the control of a foreign
jurisdiction and outside the reach of U.S. courts.8
To resolve this set of difficulties unique to the digital age, Congress enacted the Clarifying Lawful
Overseas Use of Data Act (“the CLOUD Act”) in March 2018.9 The CLOUD Act aims to aid qualifying
foreign countries in their investigation of serious crimes by speeding up access to electronic data held by
U.S.-based CSPs.10 It contains two major components. First, it authorizes the U.S. government to form
bilateral executive agreements with foreign governments that satisfy a set of criteria in order to bypass any
conflict of law problems.11 Second, it amends the Stored Communications Act of 1986 by expressly stating
that a company subject to requests from a partner nation must disclose the information in its “possession,
custody, or control” regardless of whether the communication is “stored” inside or outside the United
States.12
While the CLOUD Act appears to favor law enforcement by providing smoother access to private
data, its enforcers have declared a commitment to preserve privacy interests of individuals and carefully
avoid any legal challenges in this regard.13 The Department of Justice delineates the CLOUD Act as a “new
paradigm” and “an efficient, privacy, and civil-liberties-protective approach” to ensure data access
previously unavailable in light of “the revolution in electronic communications, recent innovations in the

7
White Paper, supra note 1 at 9 (“In this technological environment, it can be impossible for investigating
governments to submit multiple MLAT requests to multiple foreign governments to obtain electronic data scattered
in multiple countries, especially when the governments (and sometimes the CSPs themselves) do not know where the
data is stored and when the data may well have been moved to another location by the time the requests are reviewed.”).
8
The most notable example of such challenges is United States v. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016). Part
III of this Comment will discuss this case in further details. See also Johnson, supra note 2 (citing Assistant Attorney
General Richard Downing’s statement that the Microsoft case had a ripple effect on the behavior of U.S. based
companies who stopped complying with U.S. warrants for overseas data while the case was being considered).
8
See 18 U.S.C. §101(4).
9
White Paper, supra note 1, at 3.
10
Id. at 1.
11
18 U.S.C. §2523(b).
12
18 U.S.C. §2713(1) (emphasis added).
13
See White Paper, supra note 1, at 5.
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way global technology companies configure their systems, and the legacy of the 20th century legal
frameworks.”14 Despite its laudable attempt to balance privacy protection and the government’s need to
ensure public safety, the CLOUD Act raises new concerns for both foreign users and U.S.-based CSPs,
some of whom worry that the legislation, though detailed, lacks meaningful safeguards for privacy.
This Comment will argue that the CLOUD Act, despite being a functional update from the current
mechanism in cross-border data access, should be supplemented with procedural and substantive safeguards
to further ensure efficient access without compromising user privacy. The discussion will center upon
stored data and not electronic communications.15
Part II will lay out the relevant legal framework with regard to cross-border data access prior to
enactment of the CLOUD Act. It will examine the Fourth Amendment line of cases, the relevant provisions
in the Stored Communications Act, and the data request process under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(“MLATs”). Part III will examine the CLOUD Act more closely. It will briefly introduce the history of
the legislation. It will discuss the case that propelled the CLOUD Act’s enactment, United States v.
Microsoft Corp.16 It will analyze the major provisions of the CLOUD Act and explore their advantages.
Part IV will introduce the shortcomings of the CLOUD Act. It will first note the concerns arising
from the language of the Act. It will then address any potential protection gaps of this legislation. Part V
will discuss the impact of the CLOUD Act on U.S.-based CSPs from both foreign users’ perspective and
data providers’ perspective. Part VI will analyze some of the alternatives and possible improvements to
the CLOUD Act envisioned by scholars. It will try to present a general idea as to what the future holds for
the CLOUD Act. Part VII will conclude that the CLOUD Act presents practical difficulties and privacy
concerns that Congress should address by supplementing a more protective measure.

14

Id. at 2.
The CLOUD Act has a wiretap provision and its implications will not be addressed in this Comment. See 18 U.S.C.
§2523(b)(4)(D)(6). For a discussion on issues related to the interception provision in the U.S.-U.K. CLOUD Act
agreement, see Albert Gidari, The Big Interception Flaw in the U.S.-UK CLOUD Act Agreement, THE CENTER FOR
INTERNET AND SOCIETY (Oct. 18, 2019, 9:00 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2019/10/big-interception-flawus-uk-cloud-act-agreement.
16
829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
15
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II. The Legal Framework of Cross-Border Data Access
Cross-border data access is subject to both constitutional and statutory protection. As cloud
computing becomes an increasingly popular platform of electronic surveillance, the law in this area remains
multifaceted and is constantly evolving. Prior to the enactment of the CLOUD Act, at the federal level, law
enforcement access to data through cloud computing mainly implicates the Fourth Amendment, the Stored
Communications Act, and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of individuals against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”17 The test applied is a reasonable expectation of privacy which guarantees protection when one
has “exhibited an actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and “society is prepared to recognize [such
expectation] as ‘reasonable’.”18 The judicially created third party doctrine under the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is particularly relevant here. This controversial doctrine provides that an individual lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy for information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.19
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court concluded that one lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the financial records maintained by his or her bank.20 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the
Court held that by voluntarily entering phone numbers and exposing such information to the telephone
company during its regular course of business, the petitioner “assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”21
The Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on the third party doctrine does not provide much clarity
on its application to digital technology in general. In Carpenter v. United States, the Court declined to

17

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed.”).
20
Id. at 442.
21
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
18
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extend the third party doctrine to cell-site location information.22 In other words, absent a Warrant, a cell
phone user’s location history is not subject to a Fourth Amendment search simply because the user
consented to the service of the telephone company.
While Carpenter limited the scope of the third party doctrine and extended further protection to
individual privacy, the Court emphasized that the decision was “a narrow one” limited to cell-site location
information (CSLI) and does not address business records that do or do not reveal location information.23
The reasoning of Carpenter, however, opens the door for privacy protection beyond this category.24 The
Court distinguished CSLI from bank records at issue in United States v. Miller and call records at issue in
Smith v. Maryland because CSLI is not voluntarily shared in the same way in light of its “deeply revealing
nature . . . its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and inescapable and automatic nature of its
collection.”25 Given the wide use of cloud computing by both individuals and corporations, one could
potentially analogize sensitive information stored in a cloud with CSLI. Afterall, taking advantage of a
multi-device friendly, network sharing platform does not necessarily signal that the user voluntarily
consented to a warrantless search. On the other hand, one could also argue that cloud computing is subject
to less privacy protection given the availability of encryption and that the nature of the data is not as
universally private or deeply revealing as one’s location information.
Because electronic communications are often not territorially based and the nature of such
technology is more complex than traditional storage methods, the third party doctrine is less if at all
workable in this area.26 Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the Fourth

22

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools . . . nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information . . .
[or] other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.”).
24
Evan Caminker, Article: Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build A Stable Privacy Doctrine,
2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 411, 415 (2019).
25
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219, 2223.
26
See Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo, and David Thaw, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Settings:
Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 36, 38 (2015).
23
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Amendment has teeth as far as cloud computing is concerned.27 In terms of statutory guidance, the Stored
Communications Act lays out the framework of privacy protection for electronic communications.
B. The Stored Communications Act
Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), also known as the Stored
Communications Act (“the SCA”) extended privacy protections to electronic communications before the
enactment of the CLOUD Act.28
In 1986, Congress enacted the SCA in an effort to keep up with the seismic development in
technology.29 Because the Fourth Amendment’s application in the area of remotely stored files presented
many uncertainties for litigants, the SCA sought to clarify how privacy protection extends to network
account holders.30 Particularly, it regulates the relationship between governmental investigatory power and
service providers in possession of private user information by establishing a set of Fourth Amendment-like
provisions.”31
The SCA protects providers of electronic communications services (“ECS”) and remote computing
services (“RCS”).32 ECS includes “any service which provides to users . . . the ability to send or receive
wire or electronic communications.”33 RCS is defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage

27

Secil Bilgic, Something Old, Something New, and Something Moot: the Privacy Crisis under the CLOUD Act, 32
HARV. J. LAW & TEC 321, 325 (Fall 2018). The author notes the argument that Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority in Carpenter, seems to be saying that there is an “equilibrium adjustment limit on the third-party doctrine”
and that it may no longer apply if it gives the government massive new powers. Id. at n.30 (citing Orin Kerr,
Understanding the Supreme Court’s Carpenter Decisinon, LAWFARE (June 22, 2018, 1:18 P.M.),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision).
28
18 U.S.C. §§2701-2712 (2012).
29
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986) (“This bill amends the 1968 law to update and clarify Federal privacy protections
and standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies.”).
30
Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004), 1210–11. Professor Kerr suggests three reasons why the Fourth Amendment protections
may not reach electronic communications remotely stored. Notably, because all internet communications are shared
with a third party network service provider, the third party doctrine applies, and users may not be entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
31
Id. at 1212.
32
18 U.S.C. §2702(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
33
18 U.S.C. §2510(15). For example, Google acts as an ECS when it provides a user the ability to send an email from
his or her Gmail account.
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or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”34
A Warrant is required if the government seeks to obtain electronic communications from an ECS
that is in storage for 180 days or less.35 To obtain disclosure from a RCS, the government has the option to
issue a Warrant, a subpoena with prior notice, or a qualified court order under §2703(d) of the SCA plus
prior notice.36
In applying the SCA, courts have “embraced varying and often contradictory interpretations of [its]
language,” especially when the subject technologies did not exist at the time of its enactment.37 It has been
argued that the SCA, enacted more than thirty years ago, is outdated and does not apply seamlessly to the
recent advancement in technology.38
C. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Prior to the CLOUD Act’s enactment, foreign governments relied heavily on a treaty-based
procedural system, the MLATs, to access data stored by U.S.-based CSPs. To utilize this system, a country
has to have formed a mutual legal assistance treaty with the U.S. government. Countries without such
treaties typically use Letters Rogatory as a slower and less reliable alternative.39
The MLAT system involves a series of steps. To take advantage of a MLAT treaty with the U.S.
and execute a Warrant for information held by a U.S.-based provider, a foreign investigative body has to
first file a request with the central processing agency within its own government.40 Once approved, the

34

18 U.S.C. §2711(2). For example, Google acts as an RCS when it allows users to store data online in a Google
Drive for safekeeping.
35
18 U.S.C. §2703(a).
36
18 U.S.C. §2703(b).
37
Borchert, supra note 26, at 48. For example, in the context of social media, the SCA’s application is not completely
straightforward. Id. at 53 (explaining that while the scope of the SCA is limited to electronic communications
unavailable to public access, “recent court decisions suggest that some communications made via social media
networking platforms may receive SCA protections, even if they were disclosed to hundreds or even thousands of
third parties”).
38
See, e.g., Mitchol Dunham, Arbitrary and Outdated: Reforming the Stored Communications Act (August 14, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3258774 (arguing that the SCA is ill-equipped with arbitrary and antiquated rules that do
not account for the recent development in technology).
39
Tiffany Lin & Marylyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement,
Berklett Cybersecurity, 9 at n.3 (Sept. 7, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33867385/201709_berklett.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
40
Id. at 2.
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central processing agency will send the request to the Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) at the U.S.
Department of Justice for clearance.41 After confirming that the request meets applicable U.S. standards,
the OIA then works with a U.S. Attorney’s Office to have the “qualified request” reviewed by a U.S.
magistrate judge, who will determine whether the request aligns with relevant U.S. law, “notably
including the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard, rules of privilege, and the Fifth
Amendment.”42
A qualified request is then served on the U.S. company.43 The OIA will review the submitted
evidence “to ensure it meets data minimization and human rights standards” and once satisfied, it will
finally send it back to the foreign government’s central processing agency.44 Depending on the quality of
the request and the requesting country, this multi-step process can take months to complete.45
In addition to being lengthy and onerous, the MLAT system is arguably irreconcilable with cloud
computing.46 The MLAT formulation originally assumed all evidence “consisted of tangible, physical
objects located somewhere specific on a given country’s territory.”47 Cloud computing, however, involves
data storage that exceeds or dissolves territorial boundaries. The territorial assumptions of the MLAT
system are thus troublesome when applied to the free-flowing or multi-territorial electronic
communications.48

41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 3.
45
Lin supra note 39, at 3. See also Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking
2.0, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13 (May 2018) (“[A]ccording to the 2013 Report and Recommendations of the
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, delays have averaged almost a year for
such requests.”).
46
Vivek Krishnamurthy, Cloudy with a Conflict of Laws 1 (Berkman Klein Ctr., Paper No. 2016-3, Feb. 16, 2016)
(“[T]he territorially-based MLAT system fundamentally does not work with the physical, technological, and corporate
structures that are used to deliver cloud-based services.”).
47
Id. at 4.
48
Id. Krishnamurthy argues that for at least three reasons, the MLAT system no longer holds in the digital age. First,
data is being increasingly stored with multinational cloud service providers (MCPs) that operate in different countries
rather than within one country’s borders. Id. Second, for performance and reliability reasons, MCPs “shard” their data
into many small pieces that are stored and backed up in many different places. Id. Neither party can tell where the
data is physically stored until it is retrieved. Id. at 5. Third, the ownership of an electronic account often cannot be
identified until the content is revealed. Id.
42
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Furthermore, the MLAT system does not properly resolve conflicting legal obligations and
unilaterally subject foreign governments to U.S. legal standards. In fact, certain governments have begun
to circumvent this problem by requiring companies operating within their borders, including those that are
headquartered in the U.S., to store certain data domestically.49 Such data localization policies are notably
problematic for undermining web openness and restricting a company’s ability to “manage data traffic in
ways that enhance efficiency, security, and interoperability.”50 In light of such challenges, many argued
that as an alternative to the MLATs, the CLOUD Act achieves efficiency without sacrificing privacy
guarantees and human rights protections.51
III.

The CLOUD Act

As the number of MLAT requests multiplied,52 so did the demand for new legislation that responds
directly to the frustrations of foreign law enforcement without compromising privacy protection for
individual users. For years, Congress and private groups debated about a new program to better address
cross-border data requests. What prompted Congress to turn such debates into action was the case Microsoft
Corp. v. United States.53
The central dispute in Microsoft was whether the SCA reached electronic communications
controlled by a U.S.-based company but stored in a foreign country.54 This question presents difficulties
because it required courts “to divine the intent of an act written well before there was a globally
interconnected internet.”55
In Microsoft, after a magistrate judge found probable cause that an account was used in furtherance

49

Christine Galvagna, The Necessity of Human Rights Legal Protections in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Reform,
9 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 61 (2019).
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., Jennifer Daska & Peter Swire, Why the CLOUD Act is Good for Privacy and Human Rights, LAW FARE
(Mar. 14, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-cloud-act-good-privacy-and-human-rights.
52
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
FY
2015
BUDGET
FACT
SHEET
1
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/mut-legal-assist.pdf (“Over the past decade the
number of requests for assistance from foreign authorities handled by the Criminal Division’s Office of International
Affairs (OIA) has increased nearly 60 percent, and the number of requests for computer records has increased tenfold.”).
53
See 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
54
See Id.
55
Daskal, supra note 45, at 9.
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of narcotics tracking, the U.S. government served a Warrant on Microsoft at its Washington headquarters.56
Microsoft produced non-content information57 stored in the U.S. but declined to provide access to customer
content that required importation from a server in Ireland.58 The District Court denied Microsoft’s request
to quash the Warrant and held the company in contempt.59 On appeal, the Second Circuit sided with
Microsoft that the SCA sought to afford “heightened privacy protection” for domestic users and its
presumption against extraterritoriality cannot be easily abandoned by a Warrant requesting a service
provider to retrieve cross-border material.60
On July 15, 2016, the day after the Second Circuit handed down its decision in Microsoft, the
Department of Justice submitted a draft legislation to the Senate that would “help resolve potential
conflicting legal obligations that U.S. electronic communications service providers may face when required
to disclose electronic data by foreign governments investigating serious crime, including terrorism.”61 This
predecessor of the CLOUD Act proposed “streamlined solutions” by reaching a bilateral agreement with
the U.K. and subsequently establishing a framework that would set in motion more similar agreements with
countries that have strong laws protecting privacy and human rights.62
On October 16, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in
Microsoft.63 But there was no need for the Court to decide the merits of the case. Less than a month after
the parties argued the case in front of the Court, which indicated that Congress should step in to resolve the

56

See 829 F.3d 197.
Non-content information, as opposed to content information, which includes the actual content of the files stored in
a customer’s account, refers to “subscriber information such as name, address, email address, billing information, data
of account creation, and certain purchase history and service usage information.” Liz Woolery, Ryan Budish, and
Kevin Bankston, The Transparency Reporting Toolkit, THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT
HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
61
(Mar.
2016),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/Final_Transparency.pdf.
58
928 F.3d at 200.
59
Id.
60
928 F.3d at 201. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (reiterating the principal that United
States law governs domestically and absent express Congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed
to apply only domestically).
61
Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Joseph R. Biden (July 15, 2016) at 1.
62
Id. at 2.
63
United States v. Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2).
57

10

extraterritorial application of the SCA,64 on March 23, 2018, the CLOUD Act was signed into law as an
attachment to a $1.3 trillion, 2,232-page spending bill.65 The Government obtained a Warrant pursuant to
the new law and the parties no longer contested the jurisdictional validity of the alleged cross-border data
request.66
A. Main Components of the CLOUD Act
The CLOUD Act authorizes the United States government to enter into executive agreements with
qualifying foreign counties and prescribes the criteria they must meet.67 In general, the domestic laws of
the country subject to this agreement must afford “robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy
and civil liberties.”68
With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General is to make such determinations
and submit a written certification after evaluating a list of factors that are consistent with requirements set
forth in the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.69 In addition, the qualifying foreign government has to
have “adopted appropriate procedures to minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of
information concerning U.S. persons subject to the agreement.”70
Once an agreement is formed, if both countries find the circumstances appropriate, the U.S.
government and its foreign counterpart will agree to remove any legal restriction to a provider’s ability to

64

Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, 11–12, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 17-2)
(“Justice Ginsberg: so wouldn’t it be wiser just to say let’s leave things as they are; if - - if Congress wants to regulate
in this brave new world, it should do it?”; “Justice Sotomayor: Why shouldn’t we leave the status quo as it is and let
Congress pass a bill in this new age.”).
65
Johnson, supra note 2. See also Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflected-cloud-act-passes
(noting how the CLOUD Act was unrelated to the omnibus spending bill which must be passed to avoid another
government shut-down).
66
Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186.
67
18 U.S.C. § 2523.
68
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1).
69
Id. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is a multi-national agreement on cybercrime and electronic evidence
and it “provides States with (i) the criminalisation of a list of attacks against and by means of computers; (ii) procedural
law tools to make the investigation of cybercrime and the securing of electronic evidence in relation to any crime more
effective and subject to rule of law safeguards; and (iii) international police and judicial cooperation on cybercrime
and e-evidence.” The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: a Framework for Capacity Building, GLOBAL FORUM ON
CYBER EXPERTISE (July 12, 2006), https://www.thegfce.com/news/news/2016/12/07/budapest-convention-oncybercrime.
70
18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(2).
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comply with orders issued under the agreement.71 Then, both parties will be able to utilize their domestic
legal process to acquire the requested data. In other words, the CLOUD Act allows the foreign government
to bypass the several steps of intermediary review mandated by the MLATs and directly seek data from
U.S.-based CSPs, and vice versa.
The second major component of the CLOUD Act resolves the Microsoft line of conflicts by
amending the Stored Communications Act of 1986 with § 2713. § 2713 prescribes that once a user data
request is properly made, the provider must preserve, backup, or disclose the requested content “within
such provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other
information is located within or outside of the United States.”72 In short, the CLOUD Act makes clear that
SCA Warrants cover not only data stored domestically but have an international reach regardless of its
physical location. Under this framework, a U.S.-based CSP can no longer challenge a Warrant issued on
information stored in one of its foreign data centers.
B. Advantages of the CLOUD Act
The CLOUD Act’s passage received support from Microsoft and other tech giants in the U.S.73
This phenomenon is unsurprising. After all, the CLOUD Act is a rational response to new demands in the
age of the internet and embodies many advantages envisioned by both law enforcement and private parties.
Efficiency is one of the most notable advantages of the CLOUD Act. First, it simplifies the process
of cross-border data requests for large tech companies like Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Oath,
who, in the wake of Microsoft, stressed that “dialogue and legislation—not litigation—is the best
approach.”74 As the Microsoft case demonstrated, before the CLOUD Act’s passage, companies were

71

White Paper, supra note 1, at 11.
18 U.S.C. § 2713.
73
Johnson, supra note 2. See also Brad Smith, A Problem Congress Should Solve, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES, (Feb.
27, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/02/27/a-problem-congress-should-solve/ (“The CLOUD
Act creates both the incentive and the framework for governments to sit down and negotiate modern bi-lateral
agreements . . . [and] it ensures these agreements have appropriate protections for privacy and human rights and gives
the technology companies that host customer data new statutory rights to stand up for the privacy rights of their
customers around the world.”).
74
Letter from Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Oath to Senators Hatch, Coons, Graham, and Whitehouse (Feb.
5, 2018).
72
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hesitant to release user information stored in a foreign country based on the complex jurisdictional issues
presented. While Microsoft commendably sought to safeguard user privacy by investing significant time
and resources to contest an executed U.S. Warrant all the way up to the Supreme Court, many companies
understandably gave in. The CLOUD Act clarified the process for these companies, who no longer had to
balance the need to comply with the government against privacy concerns of their valued customers.
On a broader note, the CLOUD Act aids international criminal investigations and furthers public
safety by serving as a useful alternative to the dreaded MLAT process. By removing the intermediary
vetting process and replacing it with a direct but qualified request under an international agreement, the
CLOUD Act helps prevent administrative delays, especially when conflicts of law arise. 75 Under the
MLAT system, there is a lack of focus on how disclosed evidence is ultimately used.76 The CLOUD Act
addresses this issue by requiring secure data storage, mandating destruction of nonrelevant data, and
limiting the dissemination of acquired data.77
Importantly, the CLOUD Act supplements but does not displace the MLAT system or other
available mechanisms. 78 This allows foreign countries that are not entitled to executive agreement
privileges to nevertheless obtain information that meets the relevant U.S. legal standards. To ensure an
executive agreement carries out its full force without loopholes, the CLOUD Act expressly provides that a
foreign government cannot issue an order at the request of the U.S. government or a third party country,
nor can it share any information obtained under an executive agreement with a non-party.79 Thus, neither
the U.S. government nor any foreign government can seek to get around the pre-condition of forming an
executive agreement or exceed the boundary of a valid disclosure request.
In order not to deviate too far from a detailed, case-by-case mechanism, the CLOUD Act sets forth
specific requirements for any data-request order issued by a qualified foreign partner. 80 Among other
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applicable criteria, the order must “identify a specific person, account, address, or personal device, or any
other specific identifier as the object of the order.”81
The CLOUD Act, by making clear that data stored by a U.S.-based CSP is discoverable regardless
of its location, diminishes data evasion concerns, namely, the risk that a company might assist criminals by
moving data outside the United States to avoid detection.82
The Department of Justice also noted that the CLOUD Act reduces the resources needed to process
MLAT requests from qualifying countries, and it “should allow the United States to respond to other MLAT
requests more expeditiously.”83 As a result, the CLOUD Act also gives both the U.S. government and
foreign sovereigns a timely opportunity to invest those resources elsewhere, such as toimprove the MLAT
system itself.84
Furthermore, while the CLOUD Act is largely consistent with the government’s position in
Microsoft, it provides a new statutory safeguard that involves a comity analysis.85 When the recipient of a
data request reasonably believes that the sought information belongs to a non-U.S. person residing outside
the U.S. and disclosure would create a “material risk” of violating a foreign law, it may seek judicial redress
by filing a motion to quash or modify.86 To many, the availability of a judicial remedy reenforces the idea
that the CLOUD Act is a “privacy win.”87
The CLOUD Act is an effort by the U.S. government to influence international lawmaking by
domestic regulations.88 It has been suggested that by preconditioning bilateral agreements upon substantive
and procedural privacy guidelines, the CLOUD Act incentivizes a growing list of foreign countries to adopt
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more rigorous privacy safeguards, thereby raising privacy standards on an international scale.89 It has also
been said that the CLOUD Act disincentivizes foreign governments from further localizing data to prevent
outside access.90. Moreover, from a technological standpoint, the CLOUD Act largely renders obselete the
concern that different types of cloud computing should be subject to different standards.91
IV.

Privacy Shortcomings of the CLOUD Act

Along with its avid supporters, the CLOUD Act invited strong opposition from privacy, civil
liberties, and human rights groups.92 Some foreign companies went as far as accusing the U.S. government
of wanting to conduct economic espionage in furtherance of U.S. economic interests.93 The CLOUD Act,
while a functional improvement from the MLATs, is not a be-all and end-all solution. In fact, it poses
privacy shortcomings and does not immunize communication service providers from practical uncertainties
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or user privacy violations.
A. Broad Discretion to the Executive Branch and Weak Congressional Control
Most notably, despite its detailed provisions, the CLOUD Act grants broad discretion to the
Executive Branch.94 To support a written certification to Congress that the prospective foreign ally is
qualified to enter into an executive agreement with the U.S., the Attorney General will rely upon a multitude
of broadly defined factors.95 For instance, it requires that the foreign government “demonstrates respect
for the rule of law and principles of nondiscrimination” and “adheres to applicable international human
rights obligations” including “protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy,” “fair trial
rights,” and “prohibitions and arbitrary arrest and detention.”96 Such abstract language lacks the specificity
and detailedness needed as helpful guidance on whether a country truly qualifies as one that guarantees
robust privacy protections.97 It also does not define or limit the scope of the Attorney General’s discretion
and leaves much to one’s broad interpretation. Furthermore, the CLOUD Act instructs that the Attorney
General’s determination is not subject to judicial review.98 This is especially problematic and a significant
drawback considering the MLAT system’s mandatory judicial review process on a case-by-case basis.
As for congressional review, the CLOUD Act also lacks a genuinely helpful mechanism. The
CLOUD Act serves as an “ex ante” staturory authorization. No after-the-fact congressional ratification is
required for the negotiation or establishment of bilateral agreements.99 Such a bilateral agreement is unlike
an Article II treaty that requires two-thirds consent of the Senate.100 The CLOUD Act provides that the
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Senate and the House of Representatives enter into a joint resolution of disapproval within 180 days after
receiving notice of the executive agreement. 101 Deprived of the power of prior approval, in a case of
disagreement, they will face the difficult task to convince the President not to exercise his veto power or
overcome the veto themselves. 102 The CLOUD Act exemplifies the increased use of “congressionalexecutive agreements” authorized by statute. Ex-post congressional executive agreements are rare and are
mainly used in trade agreements.103 Despite the benefit of efficiency and preservation of foreign relations,
such agreements are problematic due to the lack of administrative rigor in the agreement-making process.104
B. Lowering Evidentiary Threshold and Under-specificity Issues
The CLOUD Act also lowers the evidentiary threshold required for foreign countries to obtain data
stored by U.S.-based CSPs. Unlike the MLATs, the CLOUD Act exempts foreign data requests from
review by the Department of Justice or a magistrate judge. In general, its privacy safeguard falls short of
that offered by the MLATs.105
The CLOUD Act forbids a foreign government from intentionally targeting a United States person
or a person located in the United States; the same restriction applies if the request targets “a non-United
States person located outside the United states if the purpose is to obtain information concerning a United
States person or a person located in the United States.”106 The relevant subsection also requires the foreign
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government adopt targeting procedures to satisfy this condition without specifying what standards should
be met or what the potential remedies may be.107
Notwithstanding its lack of specificity, this attempt to safeguard the privacy of domestic residents
presents practical uncertainties. Unless the user details his or her personal information publicly, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify the residency or citizenship of a user without looking into the content
of the requested communications.108 As a result, the protected information of a U.S. person or resident
could be disclosed before privacy precautions may be taken.109 Thus, while this promise not to target U.S.
persons appears reassuring, its execution will be met with uncertainties.
Moreover, this protective measure does not specify any remedial action when an executed request
incidentally intrudes upon the privacy rights of covered individuals.110 If a U.S. company, in response to a
valid request under an executive agreement, sends a document addressed to a third party whom it later
found out to be a U.S. person, the CLOUD Act does not indicate whether the unintentionally targeted person
should be implicated.
To illustrate, under a valid U.K.-U.S. executive agreement, a London detective who wants access
to a Londoner’s private files stored in his OneDrive account could go directly to Microsoft, a U.S.-based
CSP, to collect such information. The detective is not required to notify U.S. law enforcement about this,
nor is a Warrant required. Because the CLOUD Act does not clarify whether a user, rather than a company,
has standing to challenge the request, the Londoner would not be able to do anything if abuses occurred.
Also, if the Londoner’s account just happened to belong to a U.S. citizen, it is unclear what his or her
remedy might be either.
Although the CLOUD Act sets forth detailed limitations on the foreign order, some criteria
designed to narrow its application fall short as a substantive privacy guarantee. For example, the CLOUD
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Act only applies when a foreign government has initiated the prosecution of a “serious crime.”111 Other
than noting the inclusion of “terrorism,”112 the CLOUD Act does not define or explain what constitutes a
“serious crime” for the purposes of cross-border data access that would trigger its application. This gap
“leaves interpretation of that inherently vague concept to the discretion of the foreign government.”113 It is
worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a crime punishable by a two-year prison term is a
serious crime,114 and noted that for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, a serious crime includes any offense
that carries a maximum penalty of more than a six-month prison term.”115 Assuming this standard serves
as a guideline, the CLOUD Act reaches a wide range of offenses that do not remotely implicate national
security and subject private information to how a foreign government prescribes sentencing for a crime.
The CLOUD Act also provides that the order issued by the foreign government is “subject to review
or oversight by a court, magistrate, or other independent authority before or in proceedings” regarding its
enforcement.116 The language of this provision makes clear that independent review, notably court review,
is not required prior to an enforcement proceeding. It is only a viable option, which does not create much
incentive for requesters to take actively steps in ensuring that privacy risks are minimized. Moreover, this
provision does not specify the procedures for such review should it become necessary prior to the
enforcement of the order.
Additionally, the order issued by the foreign government “may not be used to infringe freedom of
speech.”117 This provision again utilizes broad language and fails to mention any particular applicable legal
standard, especially concerning the CLOUD Act’s international application. A qualifying foreign nation
could potentially infringe one’s freedom of speech in the First Amendment sense without violating this
provision if its domestic laws are less strict. Reciprocally, the same applies to the U.S. government.
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Because of its bilateral effect, the CLOUD Act does not only allow foreign governments to obtain
data stored in the U.S., it also gives U.S. law enforcement access to data located abroad without having to
find probable cause or comply with foreign privacy law requirements.118 This disadvantage is mitigated by
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that the search and seizure restrictions
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply extraterritorially to people “without voluntary connection[s] to the
United States.” 119 However, Verdugo-Urquidez has also been interpreted to mean that the Fourth
Amendment restrictions do apply to extraterritorial searches, but only if the targeted individual has
significant contact with the United States.120 Therefore, the CLOUD Act undermines privacy interests of
certain foreign users who would have otherwise been entitled to protections under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Absence of a Notice Requirement and Its Related Impact
Notably, the CLOUD Act does not afford a notice requirement.121 There is no provision in the
statute that requires notice under any circumstances “to the person targeted, to the country where the person
resides, and to the country where the data is stored.”122 This is problematic because a targeted foreign
person or an incidentally targeted U.S. person would not have the opportunity to seek redress beforehand
or afterwards when abuses do occur. 123 Another related concern arises when a country that is not an
immediate party to the executive agreement becomes affected by the data request, considering that the same
set of data can be simultaneously stored in multiple countries. The CLOUD Act does not provide a remedy
for such countries who seek to protect the privacy rights of their citizens incidentally affected by disclosures
pursuant to executive agreements.124
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D. Persistent Issues of Data Localization
Another blemish of the CLOUD Act is its limited role in remediating data localization issues. In
attempts to safeguard against U.S. surveillance, benefit local law enforcement, and boster domestic trade,125
many countries implemented data localization laws and policies that either force Internet content hosts to
store user information domestically on servers located within the jurisdictional reach of their national
government or route data packets transmitted between users within their jurisdiction across in-jurisidction
networks only. 126 Other than being criticized as a protectionist measure and imposing high costs for
corporations,127 data localization limits the ability of U.S.-based companies to “defend fundamental rights
abroad, and monopoliz[es] the competitive market for privacy controls.”128
The CLOUD Act will not adequately disincentivize data localization unless an executive agreement
is formed. So far, only one executive agreement has been entered into with the United Kingdom.129 In
other words, in practice, the CLOUD Act has not made any impact in terms of impeding data localization
and will not likely do so in the immediate future. Furthermore, a country that formulated data localization
policies to countract U.S. surveillance will be less incentivized to compromise its previous effort and “share”
information in accordance with the CLOUD Act. On the other hand, when contemplating an executive
agreement with a foreign partner, the U.S. government should bear in mind how its enforcement would
affect domestic business entities or isolate them from their foreign clients. It should not, however, ignore
the interests of countries with large markets and indirectly incentivize them to localize their data.130 Such
economic considerations arguably bear little relevance in this inquiry, but it is not difficult to see how the

125

H Jacqueline Brehmer, Note: Data Localization: the Unintended Consequences of Privacy Litigation, 67 AM. U.L.
REV. 927, 932.
126
John Selby, Data Localization Laws: Trade Barriers or Legitimate Responses to Cybersecurity Risks, or Both?, 25
INT J LAW INFO TECH, Issue 3, 213 (2017).
127
Brehmer, supra note 125, at 932–33 (noting that in 2013, it was predicted that data localization would cost cloud
computing services between $21.5 billion and $35 billion by 2016 and that “the majority of this high cost stems from
the development and staffing of necessary technical infrastructure essential for compliance with data localization
requirements”).
128
Id. at 960.
129
Gidari, supra note 15.
130
See Woods & Swire, supra note 1 (noting that if the U.S. government enters into an executive with the U.K. but
no one else, some of the world’s biggest markets, such as India and Brazil, would be left in the cold and be incentivized
to mandate localization).

21

government could easily prioritize such concerns and push privacy protection considerations to the side.
E. The Long-arm “Control” Requirement
The CLOUD Act resolves the jurisdictional dilemma raised in Microsoft by providing that
electronic communications are subject to disclosure if it is in the provider’s “possession, custody, or
control.”131 This is the same language used for subpoenas in the civil discovery context under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 34 and 45.132 Considering the abstract and often interconnectedness of cloud computing,
the question of “control” is difficult to resolve.
The “control” issue eventually boils down to a factual inquiry about whether a U.S.-based service
provider has a legal right or practical ability for the overseas data access.133 Problems often arise when
businesses are unaware of a subleasing agreement or a sister corporate entity in the U.S. that could place
their user data under the control of a U.S. CSPs, and thus become accessible to the U.S. government and its
partner countries.134 Another potential feature of cloud computing that could complicate the “control”
analysis is encryption. If a U.S. company offered its client the option of “client-side encryption,” whether
such security protection could shield the client from the reach of the CLOUD Act or how it plays out in the
“control” analysis requires further interpretation.135 Additionally, unlike the traditional method of physical
storage, there are different types of cloud storage that could require separate modes of legal analysis under
the catch-all “control” requirement.136
V.

Impact of the CLOUD Act on Communications Service Providers

As aforementioned, the CLOUD Act generated many benefits for companies that are subject to
cross-border data requests. U.S.-based CSPs with dominance in large global presence like Microsoft may
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be motivated to support the CLOUD Act because of their distaste for data localization measures foreign
nations adopted to bypass the MLATs. The impact of the CLOUD Act on communication service providers
generally is not entirely positive, however, and such negative impact could manifest more evidently in the
long run as the CLOUD Act becomes more widely adopted.
The CLOUD Act continues to implicate the concern that in response to the U.S. government’s
heightened authority in cross-border data access, foreign customers will be incentivized to move their
business to foreign companies without a presence in the United States.137 In particular, foreign users will
be attracted to countries that mandate data localization to protect their native companies.138
From a foreign law enforcement perspective, this might not be negative as it will lighten their need
to conduct cross-border data requests. From a U.S.-based company’s perspective, however, this form of
protectionism means a potential loss of customers and increased difficulty to conduct businesses abroad.
For companies that rely heavily on foreign user traffic, the CLOUD Act’s impact could be particularly
problematic.
Moreover, the CLOUD Act continues to raise practical uncertainties as to conflict of law issues.
While the law does allow a company to file a motion to quash or modify when it believes a foreign request
is improper, such challenges are limited. Two elements must both be satisfied. The company has to
reasonably believe that the customer or subscriber is neither a U.S. person139 nor a resident of the U.S. and
that “the required disclosure would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a
qualifying government.”140 In addition, absent other agreement or court permission, such a motion must be
filed no later than fourteen days after the company was served with the request.141
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In order to “reasonably believe” that the targeted person is neither a U.S. person nor a resident of
the U.S., companies must implement systems to carefully track and record the information of their
customers. Because it would often be difficult to determine the nationality or residency of the person behind
a profile, it is easy to imagine a situation where a company would be forced to examine the requested
information first without the user’s knowledge in order to get a better idea of the customer’s identity. Here,
the law does not specify or further define what constitutes “a material risk.” Because the CLOUD Act
removes the U.S. government’s gatekeeping role and allows foreign law enforcement agencies to serve
requests directly to the company itself, private entities, who frequently are not seasoned experts in assessing
foreign conflict of law issues, will be less incentivized to scrutinize such requests and raise legal challenges.
The CLOUD Act applies not only to U.S. companies but also foreign companies that are present in
the U.S. Despite having minimum contact with the U.S., they are nevertheless subject to reach of the
CLOUD Act. As a result, certain foreign governments can bypass their own privacy laws by requesting
data directly from the company’s U.S. branch. For these companies, they will continue to face conflicting
obligations between their domestic policies and U.S. legal requirements.
VI.

Looking Forward

In spite of its shortcomings, the CLOUD Act is a critical step forward as governments attempt to
tailor their ruling-making power to the modern technological landscape. As a pioneer in setting legal
standards for cross-border data access, the CLOUD Act is an improvement from the antiquated rules and a
reasonable alternative to a system that proved to be too cumbersome. By setting forth a list of preconditions,
the CLOUD Act could motivate foreign nations to adopt similar safeguards and thereby increase the privacy
standards that apply.142 With such possibilities in mind, outright opposition to such legislations arguably
misses the forest for the trees because “absent workable, transparent mechanisms to access data across
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borders, governments will seek access by other means, whether via data localization mandates or other,
more surreptitious means.”143
A. Potential Measures of Improvement
With its undeniable advantages, absent a case-by-case analysis, the CLOUD Act could potentially
pave the way for other legislations that broaden the scope of law enforcement’s access to private
information. While it is a step in the right direction, further safeguards, such as an amendment or
implementation of other mechanisms, are needed to address privacy protection concerns.144
To address the most notable criticism that the CLOUD Act grants too much discretion in the
Executive Branch, the CLOUD Act should set forth guidelines to assist companies in directly complying
with the requests of foreign governments while also remaining vigilant in protecting their clients’ privacy
rights. Particularly, the CLOUD Act could expressly clarify the methods a U.S.-based CSP may use to seek
judicial redress or elicit instructions from domestic agencies before turning requested data to law
enforcement.
External possibilities for improvement exist as well. One option is to strengthen the existing
process under the MLATs. Because the major issue that led to the enactment of the CLOUD Act was how
cumbersome it was to procure cross-border data access using the MLAT system, both the U.S. law
enforcement and its foreign counterparts could benefit without raising more privacy concerns by
implementing “improved resources, training, and streamlining.”145
Another option is to allow a multilateral treaty that incorporates “not just the U.S.’s but multiple
stakeholders’ interests.”146 By creating a streamlined process, a multilateral treaty will help overcome any
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potential conflicts of law issues.147 At the same time, because all countries, including the U.S., have to
undertake the same cross-border data access process, foreign users would not have to fear that their data is
targeted by a particular country.148
B. A Glimpse into the Future of the CLOUD Act
On October 3, 2019, the United States and the United Kingdom entered into the first executive
agreement under the CLOUD Act.149 This agreement addresses some of the criticisms about the CLOUD
Act and reinforces the notion that the law provides incentives in the positive direction. Among other
improvements, the agreement provides an additional qualify control mechanism by specifying that crossborder orders must be reviewed and certified as lawful by a designated authority, such as a government
entity chosen by the Attorney General in the U.S., or the Secretary of State for the Home Department for
the U.K.150 A recipient can raise objections to the designated authority, who retains the ultimate veto power
to block enforcement of the order.151
This historical partnership is not without drawbacks. 152 For instance, the agreement allows
disclosure of content information when there is “reasonable justification based on articulable and credible
facts, particularity, legality, and severity.”153 Once again, this requirement is vague and arguably weaker
than the probable cause standard.154 Additionally, the agreement clarifies that “serious crime” as applied
between the two countries includes crimes that require a maximum punishment of three or more years of
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incarceration, excluding misdemeanors and minor felonies.155 While this confronts one of the “specificity”
concerns, the result falls flat. While three years is more than what the Duncan Court envisioned for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the agreement seems to prove that the scope of “serious crime” as
defined by the CLOUD Act is flexibly tailored to the considerations of negotiating parties, and not modeled
after an established legal standard.
It should be noted that other CLOUD Act negotiations are also under way. On October 7, 2019,
the Department of Justice announced that the United States and Australia have entered into formal
negotiations for a bilateral agreement under the CLOUD Act. 156 On Febuary 5, 2019, the European
Commission recommended a Council decision authorizing the opening of CLOUD Act negotiations
between the European Union and the United States.157 A prospective U.S.-EU agreement presents more
complications due to the European Union’s own privacy laws and potential conflict of law claims could be
raised. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs of the European Parliament noted
several incompatibilities between the CLOUD Act and the EU e-evidence proposal.158 A U.S.-based CSP
that collects or store data in a third country but also offers services in the European Union could be subject
to both the CLOUD Act and the proposed EU e-evidence rule which stipulates the appointment in the EU
of a legal representative of the U.S.-based CSP.159 If the data is located in the U.S., the CLOUD Act applies
if there is an executive agreemet with the third country but the e-evidence proposal has no such
requirement.160 The CLOUD Act and the e-evidence proposal have two different review procedures and it
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is unclear which standard applies if a conflicting obligation arises.161 The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which took effect in May 2018 and contains specific rules governing data
transfer outside the EU162 is another barrier to a U.S.-EU alliance under the CLOUD Act.163
The signing of the first executive agreement is only a glimpse of how the CLOUD Act will appease
its supporters and confront its challengers. Without executions of cross-border data requests under the
CLOUD Act, the task of ascertaining the validity of its criticisms remains a strenuous one.
VII.

Conclusion

The conflict between the government’s need to ensure security and private individuals’ interest to
safeguard their personal information will continue to concern lawmakers, law enforcement agencies,
communications service providers, and private users alike. The increased volume and significance of
electronic evidence in a global scale have given rise to higher burden on law enforcement agencies, who
must grapple with the phenomenon that technology frequently defies traditional legal means. Such
increased burden, however, does not necessitate weaker privacy protection.
The CLOUD Act is a successful beginning to a resolution of this conflict. Nevertheless, it must be
equipped with further procedural and substantive safeguards to properly address the need for efficiency
without eroding digital privacy.
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